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Abstract
People with a self-control problem often seek relief through social interactions rather
than binding commitments. Thus, in self-help groups like Alcoholic Anonymous, Nar-
cotics Anonymous etc., members are said to achieve better personal outcomes by mainly
sharing their experiences. In other settings, however, peer inßuences can severely ag-
gravate individual tendencies towards immediate gratiÞcation, as is often the case with
interactions among schoolmates or neighborhood youths.
Bringing together the issues of self-control and peer effects, we study how observing
the behavior of others affects individuals ability to resist their own impulses towards
short-run gratiÞcation. In particular, these purely informational spillovers tend to make
agents choices of self-restraint or self-indulgence mutually reinforcing. We thus identify
conditions on initial self-conÞdence, conÞdence in others, and degree of correlation that
lead to either a unique good news equilibrium where social interactions improve self-
discipline, a unique bad news equilibrium where they damage it, or the coexistence of
both.
We conduct a welfare analysis of group membership and show that individuals will
generally Þnd social interactions useful for self-control only if they have at least a minimal
level of conÞdence in both their own and their peers ability to resist temptation. At the
same time, having a partner who is too perfect is no better than being alone, since one
learns nothing from his actions. The ideal partner is shown to be someone with a slightly
worse self-control problem, as this makes his successes more encouraging, and his failures
less discouraging.
Our paper thus provides a psychologically grounded theory of endogenous peer effects,
as well as of the importance of group morale.
Keywords: peer effects, social interactions, clubs, self-control, willpower, addiction, time-
inconsistency, memory, psychology.
JEL ClassiÞcation: C72, D82, D71, D91, J24.
I Introduction
The behavioral and economic implications of dynamic inconsistency in the preferences of
a single decision maker have been the focus of much recent work. Yet people are typically
immersed in social relations, and often seek relief from their self-control problems by
intensifying some of these interactions. Such is the case with self-help groups like Alcoholic
Anonymous, Narcotics Anonymous and similar organizations through which agents appear
to achieve better personal outcomes by simply sharing their experiences. Conversely,
there are cases where group inßuence can further aggravate individual tendencies towards
immediate gratiÞcation, as in some peer interactions among schoolmates or youths living
in the same neighborhood.
In this paper we study how observing the actions of others affects individuals ability
to exercise self-control. The paper can thus be seen as bringing together the literature
on self-control and that on peer effects. While obviously complementary as any parent
might attest these two issues have until now largely evolved as different areas of economic
inquiry (one bordering on psychology, the other on sociology).
Support groups are an important social phenomenon. Organizations like Alcoholics
Anonymous, Narcotics Anonymous, Gamblers Anonymous, Debtors Anonymous and the
like have branches in many countries, and millions of members. Yet there has been no
formal work on how these groups may (or may not) help people deal with their self-control
or addiction problems. Economists are used to thinking about how entering contracts or
implicitly binding agreements with others allows agents to achieve desirable commitment.
This, however, is not at all what self-help groups are about. Among the fourteen points
listed under What Alcoholics Anonymous does not do (emphasis added), one thus
Þnds:1
1. Furnish initial motivation.
2. Keep attendance records or case histories.
3. Follow up or try to control its members.
4. Make medical or psychological diagnoses or prognoses.
5. Engage in education about alcohol.
Analogous statements can be found in the programs of similar organizations, making
it clear that one cannot view these groups as just standard commitment devices: they
not only cannot, but do not even want to control their members, or provide them with
initial motivation. Their scope is in fact explicitly limited to fostering informational
interaction (discussion) among members. Thus in What does Alcoholics Anonymous
1The following correspond to points 1, 4, 6, 7 and 10 respectively in A.A.s list, which can be found
at http://www.alcoholics-anonymous.org/.
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do? it is clearly stated that A.A. members share their experience with anyone seeking
help with a drinking problem (emphasis added).
Once this is acknowledged, the impact on individuals behavior of confronting their
experiences with those of others remains an important open question. If such organizations
are useful for overcoming self-control problems, or sometimes perhaps detrimental, one
needs a theory to explain why. Such a theory of social interactions will in fact have a much
wider applicability than just self-help groups. As mentioned above, peer inßuences and
role models often play a critical part in young peoples choices particularly with respect
to activities that are subject to episodes of intense temptation: smoking, drinking, drug
abuse, sexual behavior, procrastination of studying effort, etc. In such settings peers may
be good inßuences or bad inßuences, and the latter scenario is often correlated with
cases of low or fragile self-esteem. Similar issues arise in a couple where both partners
are trying to quit smoking or lose weight, or in a sports team where an athlete may be
encouraged or discouraged to push himself harder by observing what his teammates do.
Finally, a theory of peer effects in self-control should be normative as well as positive. In
many cases joining a group is a voluntary decision; but sometimes it is compulsory, as
with a judge ordering an addict to attend a twelve-step program.2
In this work we take the Þrst steps towards such a theory, by developing a reputational
model that combines the dynamics of self-control with social learning. The presence of
peers makes this a theoretically novel problem, taking the form of a signaling game with
multiple senders of correlated types. To our knowledge this class of games has not been
studied before, and our analysis yields results on strategic interactions that are more
general than the speciÞc application of this paper.
There are two fundamental assumptions in our analysis. First, agents have incomplete
information about their ability to resist temptation, and must therefore try and infer it
from past actions. The lack of direct access to certain aspects of ones own preferences and
the key role played by self-monitoring in peoples regulation of their behavior are both
heavily emphasized in the psychology literature (Ainslie (1992), (2001); Baumeister et al.
(1994)). We build here on Bénabou and Tiroles (2000) formalization of these phenomena,
which is based on the idea that imperfect recall gives rise to a concern for self-reputation
that can allow time-inconsistent individuals to achieve greater self-restraint. By breaking
self-imposed rules such as diets, exercise regimens or abstinence resolutions, the individual
would reveal himself, in his own (future selves) eyes, as weak-willed that is, incapable
of resisting temptation. Such a loss in reputation would further undermine his resolve
in the future, to the point where he may abandon all attempts at self-restraint: what is
2The judge may be concerned about externalities from the agents behavior on others, or take into
account the agents own tendency to procrastinate.
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the point of abstaining from drinking today if, based on recent experience, one is most
likely to relapse tomorrow anyway? The fear of creating precedents that would adversely
impact future morale and behavior thus creates an incentive to maintain a clean track
record, in order to inßuence ones future (selves) actions in a desirable direction.
The second key assumption, novel to this paper, is that agents characteristics are
correlated, so that there is also something to be learned from observing others behavior.
This is in fact considered to be an essential element in the success of support groups and
similar programs, which are typically mono-thematic: alcohol, narcotics, anorexia, debt,
depression, etc. The idea is that members are linked together by a common problem, and
that sharing their experiences is useful. Thus, Alcoholic Anonymous clearly states that:
The source of strength in A.A. is its single-mindedness. The mission of A.A. is
to help alcoholics. A.A. limits what it is demanding of itself and its associates,
and its success lies in its limited target. To believe that the process that is
successful in one line guarantees success for another would be a very serious
mistake.
In fact, anyone may attend open A.A. meetings. But only those with drinking prob-
lems may attend closed meetings or become A.A. members (italics in the original text).3
Observing the decisions of people similar to oneself is a source of additional information
about the manageability or severity of the self-control problem. The information may turn
out to be good news, if the others are observed to persevere (stay dry, clean, etc.),
or bad news, if they are observed to cave in or have a relapse. When deciding whether
or not to exercise costly self-restraint in the face of temptation, the individual will take
into account the likelihood of each type of news, and how it would impact the reputa-
tional return on his own good behavior. Therefore, in addition to his self-conÞdence,
a key role will now be played by his assessment of his peers ability to deal with their
own self-control problems, and of the degree to which they are correlated with his own.
The fundamental difference with the single-agent case, however, is that the informative-
ness of others actions is endogenous, and depends on everyones equilibrium strategies.
As a result of these strategic interactions our model, in which peer effects are purely in-
formational, can give rise to multiple equilibria where agents choices of self-restraint or
self-indulgence are mutually reinforcing. More generally, we identify conditions on agents
initial self-conÞdence, conÞdence in others, and correlation between types (difficulty of the
self-control problem) that uniquely lead to either a good news equilibrium where group
3Both quotations are from the official web page of Alcoholics Anonymous. Task-speciÞc informa-
tional spillovers are also evident in Weightwatchers groups practice of weighing members each week and
reporting to each one not just his or her own loss or gain, but also the average for the group.
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Figure 1: This plot is taken from Christo (1999). See footnote 5 for details.
membership improves self-discipline, a bad news equilibrium where it damages it, or to
both.
In the Þrst part of the paper we focus on a symmetric situation where individuals
are ex-ante identical in all respects. We derive the equilibria of the joint signaling game,
study their comparative statics, and conduct a welfare analysis to determine when group
membership is preferable to, or worse than, staying alone. Three main results emerge.
First, the situations under which peer inßuences improve, or on the contrary worsen,
self-restraint, are fully characterized. Second, group interactions are beneÞcial only when
peers initial self-conÞdence is above a critical level ; below that, they are actually detri-
mental. When beneÞcial, moreover, the peer group is not a mere commitment device:
the welfare improvement occurs not only ex ante, but even ex post, inducing a Pareto
superior equilibrium in which all types (weak and strong-willed) are better off. Third, as
the degree of correlation between agents rises, self-restraint and welfare improve in the
good news equilibrium, but deteriorate in the bad news equilibrium. At the same time,
the range of initial beliefs for which both coexist tends to grow, creating a trade-off be-
tween the potential beneÞts from joining a community that shares common experiences
and the ex-ante ambiguity of the outcome.4
In the second part of the paper we extend the analysis to heterogeneous clubs.
Are peers with a less severe self-control problem always more desirable? Would group
members admit into their ranks someone who is even more susceptible to temptation
4This may explain the importance of a groups coordinator, whose leadership role would not nec-
essarily stem from any superior abilities (greater trustworthiness, better judgement, etc.), but primarily
from the need for coordination among peers.
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than themselves? We establish a novel and even somewhat surprising but in fact quite
intuitive result: the ideal peer is someone who is perceived to be somewhat weaker than
oneself, in the sense of having a potentially worse self-control problem. Indeed, this
somewhat pessimistic prior on ones partner makes his successes more encouraging, and
his failures less discouraging: if he can do it, then so can I.  More generally, we show that
individuals value the quality of their peers non-monotonically, and will want to match
only with those whom they expect to be neither too weak nor too strong. These results
stand in sharp contrast to those of sorting or social-interactions models based on a priori
speciÞcations of agents interdependent payoffs. Whereas these typically imply monotone
comparative statics, our analysis of learning-based spillovers reveals a general tradeoff
between the likelihood that someone elses behavior will be a source of encouraging or
discouraging news, and the informativeness of these news.
As these discussions make clear, the dynamics of self-conÞdence play a key role in
our theory of peer effects. First, self-restraint by one member today (e.g., abstinence)
improves both his and the others self-conÞdence tomorrow, and this in turn leads to
more self-restraint by all in the future. Second, another of our main results is that agents
will Þnd self-help groups useful (and therefore join or remain in them) only if they have
at least a minimal level of conÞdence in their own and their peers ability to resist the
temptation to relapse. While there is no systematic empirical literature on the subject,
Þeld studies of self-help groups have documented some robust stylized facts which our
model Þts rather well. This empirical evidence will be discussed in Section III.3, but its
essence can already be conveyed by Figure 1, which plots the levels of self esteem of a
random sample of Narcotics Anonymous members against their clean time in the group;
a strong positive correlation between the two variables is clearly apparent.5 Such Þndings
lead Christo and Sutton (1994) to conclude that
Addicts with greater cleantime tend to have lower anxiety and higher self-
esteem. The presence of such successful individuals is likely to have a positive
inßuence on newer Narcotics Anonymous members, helping to create an ethos
of optimism and self-conÞdence.
I.1 Related literature
Our paper connects two lines of research. First, there is now in economics a substan-
tial empirical and theoretical literature on peer effects. Many studies have found an
5Each point in Figure 1 represents the mean self-esteem score for 20 recovering addicts sampled within
each of 10 ranges of abstinence time. For comparison, the mean score of 20 non-addicted students is
shown as a horizontal thick line. The mean score of the 20 recovering addicts who have been abstinent
for over 5 years is similar to the student comparison group.
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inßuence of group characteristics on individual youths behavior, whether in terms of aca-
demic achievement, drug use, teen pregnancy, employment, criminal activity and the like
(e.g., Coleman (1988), Henderson et al. (1978), Dynarsky et al. (1989), Crane (1991),
or Case and Katz (1991)). While many of the earlier studies regressing individual out-
comes on group averages and observable individual controls were potentially subject to a
self-selection bias, more recent ones exploiting natural experiments and random assign-
ments have conÞrmed the existence of peer effects in academic and lifestyle decisions
(e.g., Hoxby (2001), Sacerdote (2001)). Econometric studies are clearly essential to assess
the existence and incidence of peer inßuences, but say little about how or why such
effects occur. Similarly, nearly all the theoretical literature takes the existence of local
complementarities as its starting assumption, and then explores what these imply for the
equilibrium and optimal composition of groups. Thus, De Bartolome (1990) and Bén-
abou (1993) study how peer or neighborhood effects shape the functioning of a city and
its schools; Bernheim (1994) examines how a concern for others views of oneself leads
to conformity; Brock and Durlauf (2001) and Glaeser and Scheinkman (2000) study how
non-market interactions can lead to social multipliers and multiple equilibria.6 The
only previous work endogenizing peer effects is Banerjee and Besleys (1990) model of
student testing, where complementarity arises from a common shock to the mapping be-
tween efforts and grades.7 This paper and ours thus share the basic objective of deriving
peer effects from informational externalities. On the other hand, the mechanism which
they study is speciÞc to a particular setting (student testing) and technology. It does not
apply to smoking, drinking, crime and other impulsive behaviors where peer effects seem
very important;8 relatedly, it has the feature that being with peers even bad ones is
always better than being alone.
The other literature to which our paper belongs is the one on self-control problems, due
in particular to non-exponential discounting.9 More speciÞcally, a recent line of research
has emphasized how the combination of self-control and informational concerns can ac-
count for a rich set of apparently irrational behaviors documented by psychologists, which
we can gather under the heading of motivated cognition. Carrillo and Mariotti (2000)
established the important result that time-inconsistent individuals may have, ex ante, a
negative value for information. Incorporating the idea of imperfect memory, Bénabou and
6See also Brueckner and Lee (1989) and Scotchmer (1994) for an analysis of related issues.
7The idea is that if a students classmates work hard their grades will be more informative about the
(unknown) difficulty of the test, which will then make his own grade more informative about his personal
ability (which he seeks to discover). A more discriminating test, in turn, increases the informational
return to his studying effort.
8See ODonoghue and Rabin (2000) for a discussion of some of the relevant psychology literature.
9See, e.g., Strotz (1955), Phelps and Pollack (1968), Akerlof (1991) and Laibson (1994).
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Tirole (2002) provide a theory of rational self-deception through endogenously selective
recall. Building on the work of Ainslie (1992), they then develop in (2000) a model of
self-reputation to explain the workings of personal rules such as diets, resolutions or moral
principles. A closely related line of work by Bodner and Prelec (1997, 2001) examines
the informational value of actions in a split self (ego-superego) model where the individ-
ual has metapreferences over his own, imperfectly known, tastes. Finally, our present
work shares with Brocas and Carillo (2001) a concern with direct interactions between
time-inconsistent agents. That paper analyzes how competition in the form of patent
races can improve, and cooperation in joint projects worsen, individuals tendency to
procrastinate. It is thus very well suited to studying workplace, career and perhaps po-
litical interactions, but not peer inßuences in drug or alcohol abuse, sexual behavior or
studying effort by youths. Furthermore, the strategic interdependence between agents is
taken as a primitive of the problem. In our model no individuals action directly enters
another ones payoff, so all externalities arise endogenously from inferences among peers
who observe each others behavior.
It should be clear, however, that our aim here is not to provide an all-purpose model
of peer effects. We thus do not deny the presence in some settings of complementarities in
payoffs, and recognize that groups also involve other forms of learning or signaling than
those we focus on (e.g., in a seminar). But, as evident from the literatures on addiction,
self-help organizations, and youths risky behaviors, the interplay of peer inßuences and
self-control is widely recognized as an important problem. This is therefore the main
object of our study, leading us to endogenize peer effects in a model that brings together
social learning and time inconsistency.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model. In Section 3
we study symmetric equilibria and their welfare implications. In Section 4 we extend the
analysis to asymmetric settings and equilibria. Proofs are gathered in the appendix.
II The model
II.1 Willpower and self-reputation
We start from the problem of a single decision maker who is uncertain about his own
willpower, as in Bénabou and Tirole (2000). The canonical example is that of an alcoholic
who must decide every morning whether he will try to abstain that day, or just start
drinking right away. If he was sure of his ability to resist his cravings throughout the day
and evening, when temptation and stress will reach their peak, he might be willing to
make the effort. If he expects to cave in and get drunk before the days end anyway, on
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the other hand, the small beneÞts of a few hours sobriety will not suffice to overcome his
initial proclivity towards instant gratiÞcation, and he will just indulge himself from the
start.
Formally, we consider an individual with a relevant horizon of two periods (the min-
imum for reputation to matter), t = 1, 2. Furthermore, each period is divided into two
subperiods, I and II (e.g., morning and afternoon). At the start of each subperiod I, the
individual chooses between:
1) A no willpower activity (NW ), which will yield a known payoff a in subperiod
I. This corresponds to indulging in immediate gratiÞcation (drinking, smoking, eating,
shopping, slacking off, etc.) without even trying to resist the urge.10
2) Undertaking a willpower-dependent project or investment (W ): attempting to
exercise moderation or abstinence in drinking, smoking, eating, or buying; or taking on
a challenging activity: homework, exercising, ambitious project, etc. Depending on his
strength of will relative to the intensity of temptation that he will experience as described
below the individual will then, at he beginning of subperiod II, either opt to persevere
until completion (P ), or give up along the way (G).
Perseverance entails a craving cost c > 0 during subperiod II, but yields delayed
gratiÞcation in the form of future payoffs (better health, higher consumption etc.) whose
present value, evaluated as of the end of period t, is B. Caving in, on the other hand,
results in a painless subperiod II but yields only a delayed payoff a < b < B. The
assumption that b > a means that some self-restraint (resisting for a while but eventually
giving up) is better than none at all.
As explained below, c takes values cL or cH for different types of individuals, and is
only imperfectly known by the individual himself. We assume that cH < B − b, so that
ex ante, attempting and then persevering in self-restraint would be the efficient action
regardless of type.
The agents we consider, however, face a recurrent self-control problem which will often
cause them to succumb to short-run impulses at the expense of their long-run interests.
To formalize this weakness of will or temptation problem we assume that, in addition
to a standard discount rate δ between periods 1 and 2, their preferences exhibit time-
inconsistency, represented by the usual quasi-hyperbolic speciÞcation. Thus:
1) When deciding whether to choose the NW activity or to attemptW, the immediate
payoff a to be received from the Þrst option may be particularly salient or tempting,
relative to the costs and beneÞts to be expected from the second option, starting in the
10Note that NW need not yield a ßow payoff only in subperiod I: a could be the present value,
evaluated as of (t, I), of an immediate payoff plus later ones. The important assumption is that there be
some immediate reward to choosing NW.
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next sub-period. Accordingly, the agent discounts the latter at a rate β < 1; equivalently,
he values the immediate gratiÞcation from NW at a/β instead of just a.
2) If he nonetheless decides to attempt the W activity, he is again confronted with
another (typically more intense) temptation at the beginning of subperiod II. The imme-
diate pain of craving looms larger than the beneÞts to be expected by not caving in, so in
his decision-making the cost c gets magniÞed to c/β. Equivalently, all future payoffs are
discounted by β11
The second critical assumption is that the individual has only limited knowledge of
the intensity of the temptation to which he will be subject if he attempts to resist his
impulses (W activity), and therefore of the ultimate outcome of his effort at self-control.
This craving disutility is revealed only through the experience of actually putting ones
will to the test. It cannot be accurately known in advance, nor reliably recalled through
pure introspection or memory search. As a result, the agent in period 2 will have to try
and infer his vulnerability to temptation from his actual behavior when confronted with
it (self-monitoring): how did I behave last night, and what kind of a person does that
make me? We shall discuss this assumption of persistent imperfect self-knowledge in
more detail below. First we state it formally, and show how it combines with imperfect
willpower (hyperbolic preferences) to generate an internal reputational stake in good
behavior.
Recall that the intensity of temptation during the craving stage is equal to c/β, where
the cost c is speciÞc to the activity in question while β measures the individuals general
ability to defer gratiÞcation. We seek here to emphasize the spillovers in self-learning
that take place across agents facing similar challenges, rather than the role of willpower
as a general trait. In particular, we observe that self help groups are typically mono-
thematic: Alcoholics Anonymous, Narcotics Anonymous, Debtors Anonymous, etc. The
same is true for students in the same grade or school.12 We therefore assume that agents
know their general degree of present-orientation, and for simplicity we take it to be the
same β < 1 for everyone (similarly with δ). By contrast, the cost of perseverance c is
imperfectly known, and potentially correlated across agents.
We take susceptibility to cravings to be a Þxed characteristic of the individual, equal
to either c = cL or c = cH , with cL < cH . The low-cost type will also be referred to as a
strong-willpower type, or just a strong type; a high-cost individual will be referred
11In general, the salience or willpower parameters in the Þrst and second subperiods could be different,
since the individuals physical state (e.g., accumulated stress) and environment (presence of temptations)
are likely to have changed; see Bénabou and Tirole (2000). For notational simplicity, we take them to
be the same.
12Of course there are also other groups, whether voluntarily chosen or not, where learning about and
building general character may be more important: families, churches, etc.
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to as a weak type. At the start of period 1 the agent initially does not know his type,
but only has priors ρ and 1 − ρ on cL and cH . Depending on whether he perseveres or
gives in during period 1 (and, in a group context, depending also on what his peers do),
this self-reputation gets updated up or down to ρ0 at the beginning of period 2.
The two key psychological features of the problem that we study, namely the divergence
in preferences between an individuals date-1 and date-2 selves (self-control problem) and
the second selfs lack of direct access to earlier preferences (imperfect recall), thus result
in a simple signaling game between temporal incarnations. The presence of peers will add
a social dimension, with signaling taking place across individuals as well.
We assume that resisting temptation is a dominant strategy for the low-cost (or strong)
type. The high-cost (or weak) type, by contrast, would prefer to cave in, if he was assured
that this would have no effect on his future behavior. Thus:
cL
β
< B − b < cH
β
. (1)
If, on the other hand, a display of weakness today sets such a bad precedent that it leads
to a complete loss of self-restraint tomorrow (a sure switch from W to NW ), the weak
type prefers to resist to his short-run impulses:13
cH
β
< B − b+ δ(b− a), (2)
where the maximum reputational stake b − a > 0 reßects the fact that even partial
self-restraint (choosing W , but eventually defaulting to G) is better than none (choosing
NW at the outset).
Turning now to the choice between W and NW at the start of period 2, it is clear
that the individual will only embark on a course of self-restraint when he has sufficient
conÞdence in his own fortitude: at that time, there are no longer any reputational concern
that might cause the weak type to restrain his behavior. Therefore, the expected return
from attempting W exceeds the immediate (and more salient) payoff from NW only if
the individuals updated self reputation ρ0 is above the threshold ρ∗ deÞned by:
ρ∗(B − cL) + (1− ρ∗)b ≡ a
β
. (3)
We assume B − cL > a/β > b, so that ρ∗ ∈ (0, 1). Note how, due to β < 1, the individual
is always too tempted to take the path of least resistance, and not even attempt to
exercise willpower: the ex-ante efficient decision would instead be based on a comparison
13The precedent-setting role of lapses in a personal rule as is emphasized by Ainslie (1992). Baumeister
et. al. (1994) refer to it as lapse-activated snowballing, and Elster (2001) as a psychological domino
effect. The self-reputation model presented here gives it a precise, formal content.
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of ρ0(B−cL)+(1−ρ0)b and a. A higher level of conÞdence ρ0 in ones ability to successfully
resist temptation is then a valuable asset, worthy of protection (self-restraint) in the
previous period, because it helps offset the individuals natural tendency to give up
without trying. In particular, the distortion in the future selfs preferences due to β < 1
creates an incentive for the weak type to pool with the strong one by persevering in the
Þrst period, so as to at least induce partial self-control in the second period.
We now come back to the assumption that the intensity of temptation c (more gen-
erally, c/β) is known only through direct experience, and cannot be reliably recalled in
subsequent periods. First, a craving is by deÞnition a hot, internal, affective state, which
is hard to remember later on from cold introspection. This is not only intuitive, but in
line with experimental and Þeld evidence on subjects recollections of pain or discomfort
(Kahneman et al. (1997)) and their (mis)predictions of how they will behave under con-
ditions of hunger, exhaustion, drug or alcohol craving, or sexual arousal (Loewenstein and
Schkade (1999)).14 Second, the agent will often have, ex post, a strong incentive to for-
get that he was weak-willed, and remember instead that he was strong. Indeed, there
is a lot of evidence that peoples recollections of their past actions and performances are
often self-serving: they tend to remember (be consciously aware of) their successes more
than their failures, reframe their actions so as to see themselves as instrumental for good
but not bad outcomes, and Þnd ways of absolving themselves by attributing responsibility
to others.15 In such circumstances of imperfect or even self-serving recall, introspection
about ones vulnerability to temptation is unlikely be very informative, compared to ask-
ing what one actually did a revealed preference approach familiar to economists.
The idea that individuals learn about themselves by observing their own choices, and
conversely make decisions in a way designed to achieve or preserve favorable self-images,
is quite prevalent in psychology (e.g., Bem (1972)). It is also supported by experimental
evidence, such as Quattrone and Tverskys (1984) Þndings that subjects who were led
to believe that tolerance for a certain kind of pain (keeping ones hand in near-freezing
water) was diagnostic of either a good or a bad heart condition reacted by, respectively,
extending or shortening the amount of time they withstood that pain.
II.1.1 Correlation in self-control problems
The central feature of our paper is that, instead of confronting his self-control problem
alone, the agent is immersed in a social relationship where he can observe the actions
of others. In some cases, like that of Alcoholic Anonymous, his exposure to a particular
14Loewenstein (1996) terms this kind of phenomenon hotcold empathy gaps.
15See Bénabou and Tirole (2002) for references and a model showing how the selectivity of memory or
awareness arises endogenously in response to either a self-control problem or a hedonic value of self-esteem.
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Figure 2: The distribution of c and c0.
group may be a choice variable, decided upon by the agent himself or by some principal
(judge imposing a sentence, social planner). In other situations, like public schools, there
is no such choice and peer inßuences are essentially unavoidable. We shall therefore
be interested in how group interactions affect self-discipline from both a positive and a
normative viewpoint.
What makes the actions of others relevant is that agents face the same problem (trying
to stay dry or clean, to graduate, etc.), and the costs and rewards of perseverance
are likely to be correlated among them. By observing Bs actions, A can thus learn
something about himself, or more generally alter his own expectations of success. If B
successfully resists temptation these news are encouraging to A, while if B caves in or has
a relapse they are discouraging. But since B himself is trying to control his own impulses,
the informativeness of his actions about the underlying costs depends on his equilibrium
strategy. The same is true for As actions, leading to a strategic interdependence via
informational spillovers that will turn out to have important consequences.
Figure 2 describes our simple model of the joint distribution for the costs (c, c0) faced
by two agents. The Þrst parameter, ρ, is the prior probability of being a low cost (or
high-willpower) type. The second one, α, is a measure of correlation as evident in the
conditional probabilities:
πLL ≡ Pr (c0 = cL | c = cL) = ρ+ α(1− ρ),
πHH ≡ Pr (c0 = cH | c = cH) = 1− ρ+ αρ,
For α = 0 we get back the single-agent case (types are independent), while for α = 1
correlation becomes perfect. This simple stochastic structure also has the advantage
that changes in α leave the unconditional probabilities unchanged, and vice-versa. This
will allow comparative statics which cleanly separate the effects of initial reputation and
of correlation. Finally, note that we have assumed a completely symmetric situation, in
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terms of both the unconditional and the conditional probabilities.16 In particular, the two
agents enter the game with the same level of self-conÞdence in their willpower, ρ, and this
is common knowledge. Correspondingly, we shall focus attention on symmetric equilibria
of this symmetric game. These assumptions simplify the analysis and the notation, but
are not critical to our main results or the underlying insights. In Section IV, we shall in
fact extend the analysis to asymmetric initial conditions and equilibria.
III Homogeneous peer groups
III.1 Main intuitions
1. The single-agent benchmark. We Þrst brießy review the results from the one-agent
case, as it provides an intuitive starting point to understand group interactions and eval-
uate their welfare implications. Given that the strong type always perseveres, the key
question is whether, by also resisting temptation (choosing P ), the weak type can in-
duce his future self to opt for the willpower action. The basic result is illustrated on
Figure 3, which shows how his ability to use such a pooling strategy is limited by the
individuals initial self-conÞdence.17 If Self 1 plays P with probability one, observing
P is completely uninformative for Self 2, and his priors remains unchanged. Complete
self-restraint (perfect pooling) is therefore an equilibrium only when the agents initial
16This is why there is no need to index πLL or πHH by the identity of the agent on whose cost one
conditions.
17The Þgure describes the weak types strategy in the subgame where the decision node between P
and G has been reached. This initial confrontation with cravings could be the result of an initial choice
by the agent (requiring that initial self-conÞdence not be too low), of accidental circumstances (e.g., no
alcohol or cigarettes were on hand that morning), or of a constraint imposed by someone else.
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Figure 4: Equilibrium self-restraint for a moderate level of correlation
reputation ρ is above ρ∗ deÞned in (3); in that case, choosing P successfully induces Self 2
to playW with probability one. When self-conÞdence is below ρ∗, however, Self 2 is more
distrustful, and responds to an observation of P by selecting W only with a probability
sufficiently small to eliminate the weak types incentive to cheat (making him indifferent
between playing P and G). Furthermore, the weak types probability of pooling must
be low enough that observing P is sufficiently good news to raise Self 2s posterior from
ρ to ρ∗, where he is willing to randomize between W and NW . This informativeness
constraint, Prx,ρ (c = cL |P ) = ρ∗, uniquely deÞnes the equilibrium strategy of the (weak)
single agent as an increasing function xa(ρ), which starts at the origin and reaches 1 for
ρ = ρ∗ (the subscript a stands for alone).
2. Two agents with moderate correlation. Let us now bring together two individuals
whose willpower types (craving costs) are correlated as in Table 1, and examine how this
affects the behavior of weak types at the temptation stage. As mentioned earlier, we focus
until Section 4 on the case where the two agents, denoted i and j, have the same initial
self-reputation ρi = ρj = ρ, and play the same strategy xi = xj = x. A decision by one
agent to persevere may now lead to two different states of the world: either the other
agent also perseveres (event PP ), or he gives in (event PG).
To build up intuition, let us Þrst assume the correlation between types is relatively
mild (α is small). By continuity, equilibrium behavior will not be too different from that
of the single agent case; the issue is thus not by how much x changes, but the direction
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in which it changes. The key new element is that the expected return to resisting ones
impulses now depends on what the other agent is likely to do, and on how informative his
actions are. Suppose, for instance, that agent i discovers himself to be tempted (a weak
type), and consider the following three situations, corresponding to different ranges of ρ
on Figure 3.
a) When initial reputation is low, j is most probably also a weak type, and will play
a strategy close to xa(ρ) ≈ 0. Consequently, he is almost sure to be a source of bad
news, meaning an observation of G that will reduce is hard-earned reputational gain
from playing P . This discouragement effect will naturally lead agent i to persevere with
lower probability xPG(ρ;α) < xa(ρ), as indicated by the thick curve emanating from
the origin in Figure 4. Intuitively, agent i must now must counterbalance the bad news
from j by making his own perseverance a more credible signal of actual willpower; this
requires pooling with the strong type less often, which means adopting a lower x. The
xPG locus to which x adjusts thus corresponds again to an informativeness constraint,
along which Self 2s posterior following an observation of PG just equals ρ∗. This is why
the equilibrium strategy xPG rises with ρ, as in the single-agent case. The slope is less
steep, however, due to the correlation of types: since i knows himself to be weak, and
α > 0, a higher prior ρ is only moderately better news about the other player.
b) When initial reputation is high just below ρ∗ or even above it a similar reasoning
indicates that being in a group will increase the equilibrium probability of perseverance,
relative to the single-agent case. Indeed, with j now either a strong type or a weak
type who exerts self-controls with probability close to xa(ρ) ≈ 1, agent is playing P
is most likely to lead to an observation of PP, resulting in an extra boost to his self-
conÞdence and propensity to choose the willpower activity. Due to this encouragement
effect x increases, until equilibrium is reestablished by the weak type playing P with
a probability xPP (ρ;α) ≥ xa(ρ) (with strict inequality unless xa(ρ) was already equal
to 1). This is illustrated in Figure 4 by the thick curve which rises up to (ρ∗, 1), and
along which Self 2s posterior following an observation of PP just equals ρ∗ (second
informativeness constraint). In this case, the positive externality allows the agent to
choose a less informative strategy.
c) Finally, consider situations where ρ is in some intermediate range. Conditional
on is playing P, neither PG nor PP can now be treated as having probability close to
one (or zero). Both events are relevant to is payoff, and which one ends up shaping
equilibrium strategies (i.e., which informational constraint ends up binding) is no longer
pinned down by the initial reputation. Instead, this is where the strategic nature of
interaction is determinant, resulting in multiple equilibria. Intuitively, the higher the xj
used by agent j, the more likely the event PP in which agent i gains from having played
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P , relative to the event PG in which he loses; therefore, the greater is is incentive to
increase xi. Conversely, if xj is low relative to xa, the resulting reduction in agent is
return to choosing P will drive xi down. Due to this strategic complementarity (which
operates purely through shared informational spillovers on the decision of Self 2), the two
equilibria xPP (ρ;α) and xPG(ρ;α) described earlier coexist over some intermediate range
of ρ; see Figure 4. As usual, a third equilibrium xI(ρ;α) then also exists in-between; we
shall describe it more detail below.
2. Increasing the correlation. So far we have considered the case of moderate correla-
tion, which is easier to analyze because strategies are close to those of a single agent. As
the correlation of the agents increases, the xPG locus pivots down, while the xPP locus
pivots up: what one agent does becomes more informative for the other, reinforcing all
the effects described above and making the strategic interaction stronger.
We shall now more formally analyze the informational and incentive effects outlined
above, and fully characterize the resulting equilibrium set.
III.2 Equilibrium group behavior
1. The informativeness constraints. Let µPG(x; ρ , α) denote the posterior probability
that agent i is a strong type, given that he chose P in the Þrst period but agent j chose G,
and that weak types are assumed to play P with probability x. Similarly, let µPP (x; ρ , α)
be the posterior following a play of P by both agents. Since strong types always play P ,
we have µPG < µPP for all ρ > 0. It is also easy to see that, in any equilibrium:
µPG(x; ρ, α ) ≤ ρ∗ ≤ µPP (x; ρ , α), (4)
unless ρ > ρ∗ and x = 1, in which case the Þrst inequality need not hold. Indeed, if both
posteriors were below ρ∗ Self 2 would never play W, therefore weak types would always
act myopically and choose G. Observing P would then be a sure signal of strength, a
contradiction. Similarly, if both posteriors are above ρ∗ weak types will always play P,
since this induces Self 2 to choose willpower with probability one. But then priors remain
unchanged, requiring ρ > ρ∗.18 Naturally, both posterior beliefs are non-decreasing in the
prior ρ. They are also non-increasing in x, since more frequent pooling by the weak type
makes a signal of P less informative. Equation (4) thus deÞnes two upward-sloping loci
in the (ρ, x) plane, between which any equilibrium must lie:
xPG(ρ;α) ≤ x ≤ xPP (ρ;α), (5)
18Formally, µPP (1; ρ , α) = ρ, requiring ρ > ρ
∗. The event PG has zero probability and can be assigned
any posterior in (ρ∗, ρ).
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where:
xPP (ρ;α) ≡ max {x ∈ [0, 1] | µPP (x; ρ , α) ≥ ρ∗} , (6)
xPG(ρ;α) ≡ min {x ∈ [0, 1] | µPG(x; ρ , α) ≤ ρ∗} . (7)
We shall refer to these two curves as the informativeness constraints in the good
news state PP and the bad news state PG, respectively. As illustrated on Figure
4, xPP increases with ρ up to the threshold ρ = ρ∗, after which it equals 1. Along the
increasing part, we have µPP = ρ
∗ : the weak type is just truthful enough (x is just low
enough) to maintain Self 2s posterior following the good news PP equal to ρ∗. In other
words, he exploits these good news to their full extent. Above ρ∗ the constraint µPP ≥ ρ∗
in (4) is no longer binding, allowing complete pooling. A similar intuition underlies the
xPG locus, which increases with ρ up to min{ρ∗/(1−α), 1}, and then equals 1. Along the
increasing part, µPG = ρ
∗: the weak type is just truthful enough to exactly offset the bad
news from the other player and maintain Self 2s posterior following PG at ρ∗. Naturally,
since for any given (x, ρ) observing the event PG is worse news about ones type than
just observing oneself playing P (and, conversely, PP is better news), the single-agent
equilibrium strategy xa lies between xPG and xPP .
These results already allow us to classify possible equilibria into three classes:
I. Good News equilibrium. When the equilibrium lies on the xPP locus, the agent in
period 2 undertakes W with positive probability only after the event PP . Accord-
ingly, each agents strategy is shaped by the informational constraint in the pivotal
state, namely PP.
II Bad News equilibrium. When the equilibrium lies on the xPG locus, the agent
in period 2 will undertake W with positive probability even after PG, and with
probability 1 after PP. It is now the informational constraint in the bad news case
which is relevant, as the agents posterior belief must not fall below ρ∗ even after
the other agent caved in.
III Extreme News equilibrium. When the equilibrium lies strictly between the xPG and
xPP loci, Self 2s beliefs following PG and PP fall on opposite sides of ρ∗, so he will
follow a pure strategy: choose W after PP , and NW after PG.
2. The incentive constraint. We now determine exactly when each scenario applies.
Together with the two informativeness constraints, the other key requirement for an equi-
librium is the weak types incentive constraint: in order for him to be willing to mix
between playing P and playing G, the net utility gains he can expect in the event PP
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must just compensate the net losses he can expect in the event PG. Similarly, for him to
play x = 1 the expected gain across the two events must be positive.
Let therefore Π (x, y, y0; ρ, α) denote the net expected gains to a weak type of choosing
P rather than G when he believes other weak agents to use strategy x, and expects his
own Self 2 to choose the willpower activity with probability y following event PP , and
with probability y0 following event PG. Since a weak type will reap payoff b under W
rather than a under NW , we have:
Π (x, y, y0; ρ, α) ≡ B − b− cH
β
+δ [(1− α)ρ+ (1− (1− α)ρ) (xy + (1− x)y0)] (b− a). (8)
Note that 1− (1− α)ρ = πHH is the conditional probability that the other agent is also
a weak type (high cost of perseverance). A particularly important role will be played
by π (x; ρ, α) ≡ Π (x, 1, 0; ρ, α) , which corresponds to Self 1s payoff when Self 2 plays
a pure strategy in both events. In particular, this is what happens in the third type of
equilibrium described above. The weak types indifference between P and G then requires
that
π (x; ρ, α) ≡ B − b− cH
β
+ δ [(1− α)ρ+ (1− (1− α)ρ)x] (b− a) = 0.
It is easily seen that this equation uniquely deÞnes a downward-sloping locus xI(ρ;α) in
the (x, ρ) plane; we shall refer to it as the weak types incentive constraint. Given (1)-(2),
xI starts strictly between 0 and 1 and cuts the horizontal axis at some ρ(α) which may
be above or below 1, depending on parameters. The intuition for the negative slope is
quite simple: in π (x; ρ, α) , the arguments ρ and x refer to the reputation and strategy
of the other agent, say j. The more likely it is that j will persevere (the higher ρ or x),
the greater the probability that is playing P will pay off ex-post (event PP ) rather than
lead to net losses (event PG). In order to maintain indifference, a higher ρ must thus be
associated with a lower x. For the same reason, a greater correlation α must result in a
higher xI(ρ, α).
Putting these results together with the earlier ones shows that:
 Bad News equilibria correspond to the portion of xPG locus that lies below the incen-
tive locus π (x; ρ, α) = 0. Indeed, as y = 1 following PP, Self 2s mixing probability
yPG following PGmust be such that Π (x, 1, yPG; ρ, α) = 0. Since Π (x, 1, 1; ρ, α) > 0
by (2), such a yPG exists if an only if π (x; ρ, α) = Π (x, 1, 0; ρ, α) ≤ 0.
 Good News equilibria correspond to the portion of the xPP cure that lies above
the incentive locus. Indeed, there must exist a mixing probability yPP for Self
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2 such that Π (x, yPP , 0; ρ, α) = 0. Since Π (x, 0, 0; ρ, α) ≤ 0 by (1), this requires
π (x; ρ, α) = Π (x, 1, 0; ρ, α) ≥ 0.
 Extreme News equilibria correspond precisely to the portion of the incentive locus
xI which is sandwiched between the two informational constraints xPG and xPP .
To summarize, the set of symmetric equilibria in the two-agent game corresponds to
the inverted Z conÞguration shown in bold on Figure 4. Formally:
Proposition 1 The set of equilibria is fully characterized by two threshold functions
ρ1(α) : [0, 1]→ [0, ρ∗] and ρ2(α) : [0, 1]→ [0, ρ∗/(1− α)] such that:
1. For ρ < ρ1(α) there is a unique equilibrium, which is of the bad news type: x =
xPG(ρ;α).
2. For ρ > ρ2(α) there is a unique equilibrium, which is of the good news type:
x = xPP (ρ;α).
3 For ρ ∈ [ρ1(α), ρ2(α)] there are three equilibria, namely xPG(ρ;α), xI(ρ;α), and
xPP (ρ;α).
Moreover, for any α > 0, ρ1(α) < ρ2(α), but as correlation converges to zero, so does
the measure of the set of initial conditions for which there is a multiplicity of equilibria:
limα→0 |ρ2(α)− ρ1(α)| = 0.
Figure 5 provides a convenient representation of these results in the (ρ, α) space.19
The horizontal axis thus measures the degree of correlation between the agents, and the
vertical one their initial level self-conÞdence.
The set of parameters where multiplicity occurs is the area between ρ1(α) and ρ2(α).
As correlation declines to zero it shrinks to a point, and in the limit we get back the unique
equilibrium of the single-agent case. This is quite intuitive, since without correlation
in preferences what the other agent does is irrelevant. Clearly, in our model all the
externalities are in beliefs, not in payoffs. Thus, for any α > 0 the set of ρs giving
rise to indeterminacy has positive measure, and as α rises it becomes quite large. Even
for α very small, when there is essentially a unique equilibrium, it is not always of the
same type: if ρ is high it is a Good News equilibrium, while if ρ is low it is a Bad
19We focus there on the equilibrium set for ρ ≤ ρ∗, which is the interesting case. Above ρ∗ there is
always the Pareto-dominant xPP = 1 equilibrium, plus possibly (when ρ∗/(1− α) < 1) the xPG and xI
equilibria.
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News equilibrium. Although these equilibria converge to the same limit xa(ρ), they are
qualitatively different in terms of welfare, as we shall see below.
The nature and shape of the thresholds ρ1(α) and ρ2(α) are easily understood from our
earlier analysis of the informativeness and incentive constraints. As mentioned previously
(and illustrated by the comparison of Figures 3 and 4), the function xPP (· ;α) shifts up
with α, while xPG(·; α) shifts down. Quite intuitively, greater correlation magniÞes both
the discouragement and the encouragement effects of the other agents choosing G
or P, respectively. The incentive constraint xI(·, α) shifts up with α: a greater likelihood
that the other agent is also a weak type reduces expected proÞts π(x; ρ, α), and this must
be compensated by a strategy that makes good news more likely (a higher x). From these
results it is immediate that ρ2(α), which is the intersection of xPG(· ;α) and xI(· ;α) is
increasing in α. The slope of ρ1(α) is ambiguous, however.
Note that the PG equilibrium exists only when ρ is not too high, or when α is large
enough, making a weak agent relatively pessimistic about his partners type. Otherwise
the dominant event is PP, which in that equilibrium calls for Self 2 to choose willpower
with probability one in the next period. But this implies that a weak type always gains
from playing P, violating the incentive constraint. A higher degree of correlation thus
makes PG easier to sustain. Similarly, to sustain the PP equilibrium ρ must be high
enough, making a weak agent relatively optimistic about his partners type.
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III.3 Welfare Analysis
In this section we compare welfare levels across the equilibria that may arise in a group,
and relate them to the single-agent benchmark. This last point is particularly important
because it will show when groups do indeed provide valuable help, and when they can
actually do damage. Correspondingly, we will be able to identify situations in which
people want to join such a group, or remain alone.
We shall evaluate welfare both ex ante and from the (interim) points of view of weak-
willed and strong-willed individuals. The ex-ante approach is quite standard in the asym-
metric information literature when there are different, a priori unknown types. On the
other hand, in the present context it is also interesting to analyze welfare at the interim
stage, i.e. after the agents type is revealed (and even if he later forgets it). Suppose
for instance that a judge must decide whether an agent with a substance abuse problem
should be compelled to join a support group like Alcoholics Anonymous. First, the judge
may have evidence on the agents type (spousal complaint, police reports, etc.) that the
agent either does not have or is in denial about; the judge will then want to maximize the
agents expected welfare, or perhaps social welfare, given that knowledge. Second, even
behind a veil of ignorance the judge may be concerned about the fairness of the decision,
in the sense of valuing differently the welfare of weak and strong types.
In computing interim welfare we shall be concerned with utilities which are not dis-
torted by temporary impulses and this for two reasons. First, these are the two basic
components of ex-ante welfare, which simply weights them according to the individuals
initial self-conÞdence. Thus, in deciding whether to join a group, the individual computes
the (undistorted) payoffsW s andWw that he will reap if he turns out to be strong or weak,
and then bases his membership decision on the weighted sum, W = ρW s + (1 − ρ)Ww.
Second, this focus on long-term welfare (without the temporary bias created by β at
the temptation stage) is quite standard in the literature on hyperbolic discounting (e.g.,
Laibson (1994), ODonoghue and Rabin (2000)).20
Throughout the analysis, we shall focus on the case where ρ < ρ∗, which is the more
interesting one.21 We also assume that in period the willpower activity is undertaken,
so that there is indeed a decision to be made about whether to resist or succumb to
temptation.22 As a point of reference, we Þrst consider welfare in the benchmark case
20One could also easily compute each types utility as perceived at the moment of temptation (when it
is revealed, or rather re-experienced), but this would not be very interesting, or informative. In particular,
recall that in all the equilibria (for ρ < ρ∗) the weak type is, from this short-term utility point of view,
indifferent between persevering and giving in. Therefore being in a group or not, and what happens in a
group, makes no difference to him.
21When ρ > ρ∗, indeed, there is no self control problem.
22See footnote 17.
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where the agent is alone (equivalently, α = 0). Ex-ante welfare then equals ρW sa +
(1− ρ)Wwa , where Wwa and W sa are the weak and strong types (interim) expected values
of the subgame that starts just after the willpower activity been undertaken. For the
weak type,
Wwa = b+ δa+ xa [B − b− cH + δya(b− a)] , (9)
where xa denotes his Þrst-period perseverance strategy, and ya the second-period selfs
probability of choosing the willpower option following P. Note how we have decomposed
the payoff into what is obtained under G (which always reveals a weak type, and hence
leads to NW next period), and the expected surplus that arises from choosing P. Next,
for the weak type to be indifferent, it must be that B−cH/β+δ [yab+ (1− ya)a] = b+δa;
substituting into (9) yields:
Wwa = b+ δa+ xa
µ
1− β
β
¶
cH . (10)
In equation (9), cH is not magniÞed by 1/β because we are evaluating long term welfare,
that is, welfare without the temporary distortion in preferences that arises at the moment
of temptation. By contrast, the indifference condition must hold at the temptation stage.
The second term in (10) thus reßects the value of the self-discipline (resisting temptation)
that is achieved through the reputational mechanism. Turning now to expected welfare
for a strong type, we can write:
W sa = B − cL + δ [ya(B − cL) + (1− ya)a] . (11)
Because ya < 1 for all ρ < ρ∗, the strong types average payoff per period is always less
than B − cL, which is what he would achieve under perfect information, or in a one-shot
context.23 He is thus hurt by the reputational game, whereas we saw that the weak type
gains by achieving greater self-control. There is therefore a sense in which the strong type
cross-subsidizes the weak type in this single-agent equilibrium.
We now turn to the two leading cases discussed above: welfare in the Good News
equilibrium and in the Bad News equilibrium. Since the analysis of the Extreme News
equilibrium is technically very similar, it is presented in the Appendix. Readers who are
not interested in the derivation of the welfare results may want to go directly to Section
III.3.3, which summarizes and discusses the main insights.
III.3.1 Welfare in a Good News equilibrium
From Proposition 1 we know that for ρ > ρ1(α) there is always an equilibrium in which
the weak type perseveres with probability xPP , and in period 2 the willpower option is
23This loss is independent of ρ < ρ∗, since the mixing strategy ya that makes a weak Self 1 indifferent
is easily seen to have this property. The loss disappears for ρ ≥ ρ∗.
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chosen with positive probability yPP only when both agents have persevered. The weak
types expected surplus is then described by
WwPP = b+ δa+ xPP [B − b− cH + δ PrPP (P |w) yPP (b− a)] , (12)
where PrPP (P |w) = 1−πLL+πLL xPP denotes the probability that in this PP equilibrium
player j will choose P , given that player i is a weak type. Using again the weak types
indifference condition π(xPP ; ρ, α) = 0 to simplify this expression yields:
WwPP = W
w
a + (xPP − xa)
µ
1− β
β
¶
cH . (13)
From our earlier results we know that xPP > xa: in the Good News equilibrium, the
(weak) agent achieves greater self-control than when left to his own devices. As result,
his welfare is higher. Turning now to the strong type, we have:
W sPP = B − cL + δa+ δ PrPP (P | s) yPP (B − b− cL),
where PrPP (P | s) = πLL+ (1− πLL)xPP is the equilibrium probability that j will choose
P , given that i is a strong type. Next, subtract (9) and note that for the weak type to
be indifferent both after event P in the single-agent game and after event PP in a group
setting, it must be that ya = yPP PrPP (P |w) . Thus:
W sPP = W
s
a + δyPP [PrPP (P |s)− PrPP (P |w )] (B − a− cL), (14)
Thus, as long as α > 0, the strong type is also strictly better off: W sPP > W
a
s . The
intuition is straightforward. In the single-agent case, the probability that persevering will
induce the willpower optionW next period is the same for the weak and the strong types,
because all that matters is the individuals own action. With two agents, however, the
payoff to is playing P is contingent on what agent j does, which in turn depends on
js type. Since being weak suggests that the other agent is also weak, a weak player i
has a lower chance of seeing his perseverance pay off than a strong one. To maintain
his willingness to persevere, this lower-odds payoff must be greater, meaning that the
second-period self must choose W with higher probability than in the single agent case:
yPP > ya. This yields no extra surplus for the weak type, who remains indifferent, but
generates rents for the strong type. In summary, we have:
Proposition 2 In the Good News equilibrium that exists for all (ρ, α) with ρ > ρ1(α),
joining a group is strictly better then staying alone from an interim point of view (i.e.,
for both types), and therefore also ex ante.
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What it is interesting here is the fact that joining a group can unambiguously improve
the welfare of both types, rather than just transfer surplus from one to the other. This
is somewhat surprising because, as mentioned earlier, joining a group generally entails
a trade-off between the positive informational spillover received when the other agent
perseveres, and the negative one suffered when he does not. In a PP equilibrium, however,
the latters impact on the weak types welfare is just compensated by an increase in
yPP , relative to ya. The positive spillover, meanwhile, allows each agent to engage in
more pooling (increase x): even though each signal of P is now less informative, their
concordance (event PP ) remains sufficiently credible to induce the willpower action next
period. In summary, the weak type beneÞts by achieving greater self-discipline in period
1, and the strong type gains from a greater exercise of willpower in period 2.
As seen earlier, however, such a virtuous equilibrium does not exist when initial self-
conÞdence is too low; and even when it does, it may not be chosen due to coordination
failure. We therefore now turn to the Bad News scenario (the intermediate case of the
Extreme News equilibrium is given in the appendix).
III.3.2 Welfare in a Bad News equilibrium
The derivations in this case are very similar to the previous one, but yield substantially
different results. For the weak type we have again:
WwPG = W
w
a + (xPG − xa)
µ
1− β
β
¶
cH . (15)
Since xPG < xa, the weak type is now worse off in a group, compared to staying alone.
The intuition is simple: when the other agent gives in (state PG) this is bad news about
ones own type. In order to offset this damage, the fact that one has persevered must be
a more credible signal of being a strong type, which means that a weak type must exert
self-restraint less often (x must be smaller). This, of course, only worsens the inefficiency
from time-inconsistent preferences. Things are quite different for the strong type, however.
Using the same steps as previously, we can write:
W sPG = W
s
a + δ [PrPG (P | s)− PrPG (P |w)] (1− yPG) (B − a− cL). (16)
From this condition it is evident that the strong type is better off than staying alone, al-
though whether by more or by less than in the PP equilibrium depends on the parameters.
We have:
Proposition 3 In the Bad News equilibrium that exists for all (ρ, α) with ρ < ρ2(α), the
weak type is (from an interim perspective) strictly worse off than alone, and the strong
type strictly better off.
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Figure 6: The value of joining a group. In the middle column there are three equilibria; the Þrst
entry refers to the best equilibrium for the type under consideration, the second to the worst
one.
In contrast to the Good News equilibrium, group membership now has opposite effects
on the interim utility of the two types, so its net ex-ante value is a priori ambiguous. In-
tuition suggests, however, that joining should be beneÞcial when (and only when) agents
level of self-conÞdence ρ is sufficiently high. This is essentially correct, except that ρ mat-
ters not per se, but mostly in relation to ρ∗, the level required to attempt the willpower
activity next period. In the (most interesting) case where ρ∗ is neither too close to 0 nor
to 1, there is indeed a well-deÞned self-esteem cutoff for joining a group.
Proposition 4 Assume that agents expect a Bad News equilibrium. There exist two
values 0 < ρ∗ < ρ∗ < 1 such that for all ρ∗ ∈ ¡ρ∗, ρ∗¢ , agents prefer joining a group
to staying alone if and only if their self-conÞdence ρ exceeds a cutoff ρ ∈ (0, ρ∗), which
increases with ρ∗.24
III.3.3 The value of joining a group: summary and some empirical evidence
Figure 6 summarizes the results from the previous sections. When ρ > ρ2(α) there is a
unique equilibrium; it is of the Good News type, and is Pareto superior to the outcome
achievable by staying alone. In other words, the agent is better off not just ex ante but
also at the interim stage. For ρ1(α) ≤ ρ ≤ ρ2(α), however, such gains are not guaranteed
since all three equilibria are possible. When ρ < ρ2(α), Þnally, the unique equilibrium is
the Bad News one, in which the strong type gains at the expense of the weak one.
24For ρ∗ < ρ∗(resp. ρ∗ > ρ∗), joining is always preferable to (resp., worse than) staying alone, inde-
pendently of ρ ∈ [0, ρ∗]. Recall that ρ∗ is given by (3) as a simple function of the models parameters.
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Two lessons can be drawn from our analysis:
1. Not all types beneÞt from joining a group. In particular, if ρ ≤ ρ2(α) there is always
an equilibrium in which the weak and strong types have conßicting interests: the
former would be better off alone, while the latter would gain from being in a group.
Consequently, at the ex-ante stage, individuals will form (homogenous) groups only
in a Good News equilibrium or, in a Bad News equilibrium, when self conÞdence is
high enough.
2. There is, in some sense, a tradeoff between the potential beneÞts achievable through
group membership, and the uncertainty over whether these gains will be reaped, or
turn into losses, due to the multiplicity of possible equilibria. As the correlation α
increases, so do the beneÞts of group membership in the best (Good News) equilib-
rium, but the set of parameters for which there is a multiplicity of possible outcomes
also expands. Moreover, the welfare of the weak type under the worst (Bad news)
equilibrium decreases with α.
As seen in the introduction, there is direct evidence of a positive correlation between
individuals level of self-esteem and their clean time in support groups. An example is
the study of 200 members of Narcotics Anonymous illustrated in Figure 1.25 De Soto et
al. (1985) perform a similar exercise for a completely different group and in a different
context (a sample of 312 members of Alcoholics Anonymous), and obtain similar results.
The correlation thus seems to be a robust stylized fact. A plausible interpretation of this
evidence is that group interactions help individuals sustain desirable behavior, which in
turn raises their self-esteem. This would be in line with our results, since the building
up and maintenance of self-conÞdence is the very focus of the model. The authors of
these studies, however, do not test whether the observed correlation is due to beneÞcial
effects of the programs or to self-selection: it could be that agents with lower self-esteem
drop out because they do not Þnd group membership useful (in expected terms).26 This
25Analogous results are obtained with anxiety instead of self-esteem. See Christo and Sutton (1994)
and Christo (1999). Note that the time on the horizontal axis is the number of months of abstinence, as
opposed to simple tenure in the group. There is thus no contradiction between the upward trend and the
requirement, common to all Bayesian learning models, that individual beliefs should follow a martingale
(hence also average beliefs, absent selective attrition of the type discussed below).
26The large impact of the Þrst 3 months apparent on Figure 1 gives credence to the self-selection
hypothesis, at least at the beginning, since it is widely believed that such programs need longer periods
of time to produce beneÞcial effects. The gap between the indices of self-conÞdence of the average member
of Narcotics Anonymous and of the average member of the reference group (60 non-addict students of a
London Polytechnic) is reduced by nearly 30 per cent between the Þrst and second observations. Later on,
however, selective attrition is unlikely to account for most of the upward trend, as De Soto et al. (1994)
cite a number of follow-up (longitudinal) studies of alcoholics that do show individual improvements in
self-esteem during abstinence time.
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interpretation of the data (which does not conßict with the Þrst one) is also in line with our
theoretical predictions: as seen above, agents with relatively high self conÞdence always
Þnd group membership beneÞcial, while it is only those with low self-conÞdence who may
Þnd peer interactions detrimental, and prefer isolation.
IV Heterogeneous peer groups
We have until now focussed attention on the symmetric equilibria that arise in a ho-
mogenous group. We now consider the more general case where peers may differ in their
preferences, willpower, or incentives to exercise self-restraint. Such heterogeneity leads
to asymmetric equilibria, which we fully characterize. Conversely, we show that asym-
metric equilibria cannot arise in a homogenous group. This extended analysis allows
us to answer two important questions about the nature of peer interactions. The Þrst is
whether an individual can free-ride on others behavior, increasing his self-control at their
expense.27 The second and central issue is the impact on each individuals behavior and
welfare of the groups or clubs composition. For instance, when an agents self-control
problem becomes less severe due to better time-consistency, external incentives, or lower
temptation payoffs does this help or hurt his peers? Would anyone accept a partner
whom they perceive to be weaker than themselves?
IV.1 Equilibrium behavior
We consider a more general, possibly asymmetric correlation structure between the two
agents costs, represented by a joint distribution F (c1, c2) over {cH , cL} ×{cH , cL} . In-
dividuals unconditional expectations or initial self-conÞdence levels will still be denoted
as ρi ≡ PrF (ci = cL), and the conditional probabilities as πiLL ≡ PrF (ci = cL | cj = cL)
and πiHH ≡ PrF (ci = cH | cj = cH), for i = 1, 2.28 We only impose a general condition of
positive correlation between agents craving costs (monotone likelihood ratio property):
PrF ((cH , cL))
PrF ((cL, cL))
<
PrF ((cH , cH))
PrF ((cL, cH))
. (17)
We also allow for differences in agents preferences parameters such as ai, bi, Bi, βi, etc.29
As a result, their self-conÞdence thresholds for attempting the willpower activity in the
27 In a symmetric equilibrium everyone uses the same strategy, and therefore beneÞts equally from
the spillovers provided by the group. When different strategies are allowed, one may imagine a case in
which agent 1s actions (say) are so informative that agent 2 can afford to be less informative.
28We shall similarly denote πiHL ≡ 1−πiLL and πiLH ≡ 1−πiHH . Condition (17) below is then equivalent
to πiLH/π
i
LL < 1 < π
i
HH/π
i
HL, for i = 1, 2.
29The two agents could also face different costs in each state, ciH and c
i
L, with joint distribution F over©
c1H , c
1
L
ª ×©c2H , c2Lª , as long as the conditions (1), (2) and 0 < ρ∗i < 1 are satisÞed for both of them.
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Figure 7: Good News, Bad News and Extreme News equilibria
second period, deÞned by (3), may be different. We shall denote them as ρi∗, and focus
on the interesting case where ρi < ρi∗ for all i; one can think of ρi∗−ρi as the individuals
demand for self-conÞdence. Finally, the two individuals may now use different self-
restraint strategies (probability of perseverance by a weak type), which we shall denote as
x1 and x2. Although it is much more general than the symmetric case considered earlier,
this game can be analyzed using the same key concepts and intuitions.
1. Informativeness constraints. In keeping with previous notation, let µiPP (x
i, xj) and
µiPG(x
i) denote individual is posteriors about his own type when both agents persevered
in the previous period, and when he persevered but the other agent did not.30 The same
simple reasoning as in Section III.2 (namely, the choice of W in the second period must
be state-contingent) shows that, in any equilibrium, these beliefs must satisfy:
µiPG(x
j ) ≤ ρi∗ ≤ µiPP (xi, xj). (18)
As shown in the appendix and illustrated on Figure 7, each equation µiPP (x
i, xj) = ρi∗
uniquely deÞnes a downward-sloping function xi = X iPP (x
j ), with (X1PP )
−1 steeper than
X2PP . As long as the two agents are not excessively different from one another, there is
then a unique intersection EGN = (x1PP , x
2
PP ) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1], where both (weak) agents
play their good news strategies.31 Similarly, each equation µiPG(x
i) = ρi∗ has a unique
30Clearly, µiPG(x
i) is independent of xj : once agent j has given in, his type is completely revealed.
The functions µiPP and µ
i
PG depend of course on the joint distribution F, as do the proÞt functions Π
i
deÞned below. For notational simplicity we shall leave this dependence implicit.
31For simplicity, we shall focus on this case from here on. The case where any of the intersections
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Figure 8: Mixed, Extreme News, and Bad News equilibria
solution xi = xiPG, which corresponds on Figure 7 to a straight horizontal or vertical line.
At the intersection EBN = (x1PG, x
2
PG), both (weak) agents play their bad news strate-
gies. Quite intuitively, each of these lines lies closer to the origin than the corresponding
X iPP curve, so that together the four constraints in (18) deÞne a permissible region
EBNE
0EGNE00 within which any equilibrium must lie:
xiPG ≤ xi ≤ X iPP (xj). (19)
2. ProÞtability constraints. Let Πi (xj, yiPP , y
i
PG) denote the net expected gains to a
weak agent i if he chooses P rather thanG, given that the other (weak) agent uses strategy
xj and that agent is own second-period self will choose the W activity with probabilities
yiPP and y
i
PG following the events PP and PG respectively. Let π
i (xj) ≡ Πi (xj , 1, 0),
and denote as xjI the solution to the linear equation π
i (xj) = 0.32
Clearly, in any equilibrium it must be that Πi (xj , yiPP , y
i
PG) ≥ 0, with equality unless
xi = 1. Following a reasoning similar to that of Proposition 1, we can combine this
condition with the second-period selves optimal behavior to show that(
if ρi∗ < µiPP (x
i, xj) then πi (xj) ≤ 0,
if ρi∗ > µiPG(x
i) then πi (xj) ≥ 0, (20)
xiPP occurs outside the [0, 1]× [0, 1] box (implying a corner solution for is equilibrium strategy) is easily
analyzed using the techniques developed in this section, and it yields the same intuitions.
32We do not a priori constrain xjI to lie in [0, 1].
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for i = 1, 2. Given our deÞnitions, these conditions translate into:(
if xj > xjI then x
i = X iPP (x
j );
if xj < xjI then x
i = xiPG.
(21)
The two incentive-constraint loci x1 = x1I and x
2 = x2I divide the (x
1, x2) plane into
four quadrants. By (21), we see that:
1) The only possible equilibrium inside the Northeast (respectively, Southwest, North-
west, or Southeast) quadrant is the point EGN (respectively, EBN , E0, or E00), and it is
indeed an equilibrium when it lies in the said quadrant.
2) The only possible equilibria along the quadrant boundaries are: i) EI = (x1I , x
2
I),
when it lies inside the region EBNE0EGNE00; ii) the point EM ≡ ((X2PP )−1 (x2I) , x2I) when
it lies on the upper boundary of that region, as on the left panel of Figure 8; iii) the point
EM ≡ (x1I , (X1PP )−1 (x1I)) when it lies on the right boundary of that same region, as on
the right panel of Figure 8.
These simple conditions allow us to completely derive the set of equilibria, depending
on the location of EI in the (x1, x2) plane. We provide these general results in the
appendix, and focus here on the case where all three possible types of equilibria coexist,
so that we can analyze the comparative statics of each one. It is easily seen from (21)
that a necessary and sufficient condition for multiplicity is that the point EI lie in the
permissible region of Figures 78, that is,
xiPG < x
i
I < X
i
PP (x
i
I), for i = 1, 2. (22)
Proposition 5 When condition (22) holds, the equilibrium set S is determined as follows.
i) If xiPG < x
i
I < x
i
PP , for i = 1, 2, then S = {EBN , EI , EGN} .
ii) If x1PG < x
1
I < x
1
PP but x
2
I > x
j
PP then S =
n
EBN , EI , EM ≡ ((X2PP )−1 (x2I) , x2I)
o
.
iii) If x2PG < x
2
I < x
1
PP but x
1
I > x
1
PP then S =
n
EBN , EI , EM ≡ (x1I , (X1PP )−1 (x1I))
o
.
When (22) does not hold there is a unique equilibrium, as speciÞed in the appendix.
Thus, under condition (22) there is an equilibrium where both agents are in a bad
news regime, another one where both are in an extreme news regime, and a third one
where at least one of them is in a good news regime. In the last case the other agent
plays either a good news strategy (we can then unambiguously refer to the equilibrium
as a Good News equilibrium) or else an extreme news strategy (we refer to this as a
Mixed equilibrium, hence theM subscript). Such a Mixed equilibrium occurs when EI is
located inside the permissible region, but either higher than or to the right of EGN ; see
Figure 8. In such a situation the informativeness constraint πj = 0 is binding on one agent
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and the incentive constraint µiPP (x
i, xj) = ρi∗ on the other, so that the equilibrium lies at
their intersection. Intuitively, this corresponds to a situation where agent is self-control
problem is signiÞcantly worse than agent js.
Conversely, note that in a symmetric game the two agents incentive constraints are
symmetric, so their intersection EI must lie on the diagonal. The same is true for the
informativeness constraints in each state and their respective intersections EGN and EBN .
Consequently, we have:
Corollary 1 In a homogeneous peer group (ex-ante identical agents), there can be no
asymmetric equilibria.
This result is interesting because it makes clear that when agents are ex-ante identical,
none of them can free ride on the other, i.e. engage in more pooling with strong types
(choose a higher x1, which is beneÞcial ex ante) with the expectation that the other agent
will make up for the reduced informativeness of the joint outcome by adopting a more
separating strategy (a low x2). In a symmetric group, therefore, no one ever gains (ex
ante) at the expense of others. This will no longer be the case when the agents are
heterogeneous.
IV.2 Comparative statics and welfare analysis
We now examine how a change in the severity of the self-control problem of one individual
affects the behavior and welfare of his peers. Note that since the type and actions of agent
i do not directly enter the payoff of agent j, a change in is parameters can affect j only
through the informational content of the jointly observed behavior.
One might think that having a partner who Þnds it easier (or faces better incentives)
to exert self-restraint is always beneÞcial. The insights already obtained from our model
suggest that this need not be true. A person who never gives in to temptation, either
because he is never really tempted (strong type), or is able to exercise nearly perfect
self control (x close to 1, due for instance to a high self-reputational stake), provides no
informational spillover at all to his partners. Being with someone who is too perfect, or
always acts that way, is thus no better than being alone, and therefore less desirable than
being matched to someone with more imperfect self-control. Of course, one would also
expect that an excessively weak partner will be undesirable, as he is likely to generate
only bad news. In line with these intuitions, we shall demonstrate that individuals value
the quality of their peers non-monotonically.
The fact that the only externalities in the model are informational implies that, from
the point of view of agent 2, a sufficient statistic for all the preference parameters of agent 1
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is his self-reputation threshold ρ1∗, deÞned by (3). A lower degree of willpower β1, a lower
long-run payoff from perseverance B1, or a higher payoff from the no-willpower option
a1 all translate into a higher self-conÞdence hurdle ρ1∗ that agent 1 must achieve if he
is to choose W in the second period. Together with the joint cost distribution F (c1, c2),
this is all that agent 2 needs to know about his peer. In our analysis we can therefore
simply examine the effects on agent 2 of variations in ρ1∗, without having to specify their
ultimate source.33
Rather than examine the local comparative statics of each equilibrium separately, we
shall integrate them into a more interesting global analysis, allowing us in particular to
ask what type of partner is (ex-ante) optimal. SpeciÞcally, we gradually raise ρ1∗ from 0
to 1, and track the equilibrium with the highest level of self-control as it evolves from the
Good News type to the Mixed type that is its natural extension, and Þnally to the Bad
News type.34 The key results are illustrated on the right panel of Figure 9.
Proposition 6 In a heterogenous peer group where the equilibrium with the most self-
control is always selected:
i) Each agents ex-ante welfare W i is hump-shaped with respect to the severity of his
partners potential self-control problem, as measured by ρj∗.
ii) The partner who maximizes agent is welfare is one who is expected to be a little
weaker than him, that is, who has a ρj∗ somewhat above ρj∗.
iii) Group membership is strictly preferable to isolation only if the partner is neither
too strong nor too weak compared to oneself (ρj∗ belongs to an interval that contains ρi∗).
These results reßect a very intuitive tradeoff between the likelihood that the peers
behavior will be a source of encouraging or discouraging news, and the informativeness of
his perseverance or giving up. The Þrst effect tends to make a stronger partner preferable,
since he is more likely to behave well, and thus be a source of good news. The second
effect favors having a weaker partner, since low expectations make his successes more
meaningful, and his failures less so. Figure 9 shows that for relatively low values of
33One might think about also varying agent 1s initial self-conÞdence (and reputation) ρ1, but this
turns out not to be a very meaningful exercise. Indeed, ρ1 cannot be varied without also altering either
agent 2s own self-conÞdence ρ2, or the entire correlation structure between the agents: by Bayes rule,
ρ2 = ρ1π2LL +(1− ρ1)(1− π2HH). For instance, if it is common knowledge that both agents are always of
the same type (πiHH = π
i
LL = 1), then ρ
1 ≡ ρ2. Conversely, for ρ2 to remains unaffected, the conditional
probabilities π2LL and π
2
HH must decrease in just the right way. Intuitively, if an agents view of his peer
changes he must also revise his own self-view, or the extent to which their preferences are correlated.
34The comparative statics of the Extreme and Bad News equilibria are also obtained in the process.
It is important to note that while we focus here (for completeness) on the case where all three equilibria
coexist, all our results (Proposition 6 below) apply unchanged when there is a unique equilibrium that is
of the Good News or Mixed type. (See the proof of Proposition 5 and Figure 10 in the Appendix for the
parameter conÞgurations that lead to uniqueness).
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Figure 9: The effect on agent 2 of the severity of his peers potential self-control problem.
The right panel depicts both agent 2s behavior x2 (when weak) and his ex ante welfare
W 2 = ρ2W 2,s + (1 − ρ2)W 2,w. Indeed, W 2,w strictly increases with x2, while W 2,s is al-
ways nondecreasing in ρ1∗.
ρ1∗ informativeness is the main concern (so x2 and W 2 increase with ρ1∗), whereas at
higher values it is the likelihood effect that dominates (so x2 and W 2 decline). The
Þrst case obtains as long as the Good News equilibrium can be sustained. The second
case corresponds Þrst to the Mixed equilibrium (where only agent 1 plays the good news
strategy), and then to the Bad News equilibrium that necessarily prevails when one of
the peers is too weak.
We now derive Proposition 6 by means of a simple graphical analysis: as ρ1 increases
from 0 to 1, the high self-restraint equilibrium set is shown to travel along the path marked
by arrows on the left panel of Figure 9. The implied self-control behavior (and welfare)
of agent 2 can then simply be read off the right panel of the Þgure. Since these graphs
convey the essence of the results in Proposition 6, and the main underlying intuitions
were explained above, readers who want to skip the formal analysis may move directly to
the next section.
1. Good News equilibrium. Recall that when ρ∗1 < ρ1 agent 1 can always achieve
complete self control on his own (x1 = 1), in which case agent 2 learns nothing from ob-
serving his peers behavior; hence x2 = x2a, as when there is no group. For a relatively low
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value of ρ1∗ ≥ ρ1, we are in a conÞguration like that of Figure 7, with EGN constituting a
Good News equilibrium, located at the intersection of the two informativeness constraints
µ1PP (x
1, x2) = ρ1∗ and µ2PP (x
1, x2) = ρ2∗. An increase in ρ1∗ causes the locus X1PP to shift
left, meaning that agent 1 becomes less likely to exert self-control. Indeed, in order to
close the larger self-conÞdence gap ρ1∗−ρ1 that he now faces, his perseverance must be
a more credible signal of being a strong type; this requires less pooling by the weak type.
Agent 2s informativeness constraint X2PP , by contrast, is unchanged. As a result, the
equilibrium EGN travels left and up along the X2PP locus: x
1 decreases, but x2 increases.
Thus agent 2 is actually better off from a (marginal) worsening in the severity of his peers
self-control problem.35 The intuition for this perhaps surprising result is simple: as the
extent to which agent 1s perseverance (when it occurs) is really good news increases,
agent 2 (when weak) is able to engage in more pooling, which means persevering more
often. In the tradeoff mentioned earlier between the likelihood and informativeness of a
peers perseverance, the latter concern dominates.
2. Mixed equilibrium. As ρ1∗ keeps rising, agent 1 becomes less and less likely to
exert self-restraint (x1PP continues to decline along the path shown on Figure 9), and we
eventually reach a point where agent 2 becomes more concerned about the low likelihood
of receiving good news (or high likelihood of receiving bad news) from his peer, than about
their informativeness. This occurs on Figure 9 at the point where EGN , in its leftward
movement, encounters the vertical x1 = x1I locus.
36 By Proposition 5, EGN then ceases
to be an equilibrium, and is replaced by EM ≡ (x1I, (X1PP )−1 (x1I)). Further increases in
ρ1∗ cause EM to move down along the x1I locus, so that x
2 = x2M now declines, as shown
on Figure 9. Thus, a weak agent 2 now loses self-discipline and welfare from interacting
with a worse peer. A strong agent 2 is unaffected, since x1 remains unchanged at x1I .
Putting this case together with the previous one, the fact that self-control and welfare
are maximized by a match with a somewhat weaker partner (so that the peak on Figure
9 occurs to the right of ρ2∗) is easily seen by recalling that, in a symmetric situation, EGN
is an equilibrium, whereas EM is not.
3. Bad News equilibrium. As agent 1s (potential) self-control problem becomes still
more severe (ρ1∗ continues to rise), there comes a point where the likelihood that he will
35This is obvious for a weak agent 2, since he gains self-restraint. The fact that the strong type is also
better off is proved in the Appendix.
36Recall that the x1I locus is deÞned by agent 2s incentive constraints π
2
¡
x1
¢
= 0, which is independent
of ρ1∗ or any other of the parameters characterizing agent 1. By contrast, as we make agent 1s self-control
problem more difficult (say, decreasing B1 increasing a1, etc., causing ρ1∗ to increase), the level of self-
control x2I by agent 2 required for the indifference condition π
1
¡
x2
¢
= 0 to hold rises. Thus the x2I locus
shifts up with ρ1∗, and so does the point EM = (x1I , x
2
I).
34
be a source of bad news is so high that positive group externalities can no longer be
sustained, and only the Bad News equilibrium survives. This occurs on Figure 9 when
the Southward-moving point EM falls below the Extreme News point EI , which is moving
North. The relevant equations from there on are µ1PG (x1) = ρ
1∗ and µ2GP (x2) = ρ
2∗,
which correspond on Figure 9 to the lines x1 = x1PG and x
2 = x2PG. As ρ
1∗ continues to
rise x1PG shifts left (for the same reason as the X
1
PP schedule did), but x
2
PG is unchanged.
As a result, x1 decreases, but x2 remains unaffected. There is thus no impact on agent
2s behavior, and it is easy to see that there is no impact on his welfare either.37
V Conclusion
The starting point of this paper was the observation that informational spillovers are
an important part of peer interactions, particularly when individuals face self-control
problems. To analyze these interactions and their welfare implications, we proposed a
model that combines that combines imperfect willpower, self-signaling and social learning.
Observing how others deal with impulses and temptation can be beneÞcial or detri-
mental, since these news can improve or damage the agents self-conÞdence in his own
prospects. One might therefore have expected that, even when learning from peers is ben-
eÞcial ex ante, at the interim stage some type of agent would lose and another gain from
such interactions. We showed, however, that under appropriate conditions the main one
being that everyone have some minimum level of self-conÞdence all types can beneÞt
from joining a group. Among individuals with really poor self-conÞdence, by contrast,
social interactions will only aggravate the immediate-gratiÞcation problem, and lower ex-
ante welfare. Furthermore, we showed that peer inßuences in self-control can easily give
rise to multiple equilibria, even when agents payoffs are completely independent. There
is in fact often a trade-off between the potential beneÞts from joining a group and the
underlying uncertainty about its equilibrium outcome. A higher degree of correlation
between agents types improves welfare in the best group equilibrium but lowers it in the
worse one, while also widening the range of initial self-conÞdence levels where multiplicity
occur.
We also examined the effects of heterogeneity among peers, and showed that individ-
uals generally value the quality of their peers non-monotonically in contrast to most
models where social payoffs are exogenously speciÞed. Intuitively, a person who is too
weak is most likely to exhibit demoralizing behavior, while one who is too strong is one
from whose likely successes there is little to be learned. Thus, there will be gains to group
formation only among individuals who are not too different from one another in terms
37This is formally show in the Appendix, for both types.
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of preferences, willpower, and external commitments. We showed furthermore that the
(ex-ante) ideal partner is someone who is perceived to be a little weaker than oneself
reßecting the idea that if he can do it, then surely I can.
Our model thus sheds light on several important aspects of the social dimension of
self-control, and its premises and predictions are consistent with the available evidence
from the clinical psychology literature. Nonetheless, it is still clearly oversimplistic, and
could be extended in several directions. For instance, with longer horizons, what an
individual learned about a peer would affect the desirability of continuing that particular
relationship, leading to rich sorting dynamics through matches and quits.
A particularly interesting direction for further research would be to explore peer effects
that involve excessive, rather than insufficient, self-regulation.38 The social aspects of
compulsive behavior seem particularly relevant with respect to work effort, and could
provide a self-reputational theory of the rat race. Finally, extending our framework to
richer organizational settings should lead to a better understanding of team or employee
morale.
38See Bodner and Prelec (1997) and Benabou and Tirole (2000) for accounts of rigid behavior and
compulsive personal rules in a single-agent setting.
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VI Appendix
In the proofs of Propositions 1 and 5 , and in the discussion in the text, we use certain
properties of the solutions to the systems of equations µiPP (x
1, x2) = ρi∗ and µiPG(x
j) =
ρi∗, for i = 1, 2. The following Lemma establishes these properties:
Lemma 1 For i, j = 1, 2 with i 6= j:
i) The loci XiPP (x
i, xj) are decreasing in xj. Furthermore X2PP (x
1) cuts (X1PP )
−1
(x1)
from below at most one intersection in the positive orthant.
ii) If ρi < ρi∗ and the two agents are not excessively different from one another,
then there is a unique interior solution for each system of equations: namely,
(x1PP , x
2
PP ) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] and (x1PG, x2GP ) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1].
Proof. i) We Þrst verify that X iPP (x
i, xj) is decreasing in xj. By Bayes rule,
µiPP (x
i, xj)
1− µiPP (xi, xj)
=
Pr (ci = cL, c
j = cL) + Pr (c
i = cL, c
j = cH)x
j
Pr (ci = cH , cj = cL) xi + Pr (ci = cH , cj = cH) xixj
, (23)
µiPG(x
j)
1− µiPG(xj)
=
Pr (ci = cL, c
j = cH)
Pr (ci = cH , cj = cH) xi
. (24)
Clearly, µiPP and µ
i
PG are both decreasing in x
i. To see that µiPP is decreasing in x
j as well,
note that ∂µiPP (x
i, xj)/∂xj has the same sign as the determinant Pr ((cL, cH)) Pr ((cH , cL))−
Pr ((cL, cL)) Pr ((cH , cH)) , which is negative by the monotone likelihood condition (17).
Therefore ∂X iPP (x
i, xj)/∂xj < 0 by the implicit function theorem. Next, to see that
X2PP (x
1) cuts (X1PP )
−1
(x1) from below at most a unique intersection in the positive or-
thant, note that X2PP (0) is bounded for x
1 ∈ [0, 1]. By contrast, we can easily verify
that limx1→0 (X1PP )
−1
(x1) = +∞. Therefore there exists a point x1 small enough such
that X2PP (x
1) < (X1PP )
−1
(x1). To complete the argument, we now show that these two
loci cross at most once in the positive orthant: so if they do intersect, it must be with
X2PP (x
1) crossing (X1PP )
−1
(x1) from below. Note Þrst that any intersection must by such
that (µiPP (x
1, x2)) / (µ2PP (x
1, x2)) = (ρ1∗) / (ρ2∗) . By (23), this implies
x2 =
µ
ρ1∗ PrF [(cH , cL)]
ρ2∗ PrF [(cL, cH)]
¶
x1 +
µ
ρ1∗
ρ2∗
− 1
¶µ
PrF ((cL, cL))
PrF ((cL, cH))
¶
.
This deÞnes an upward-sloping line in the (x1, x2) plane, which can have at most one
intersection with the decreasing curve X2PP (x
1).
ii) It is straightforward to verify that if the agents are symmetric and ρi < ρ∗,
then the solutions are interior in (0, 1). By continuity, if asymmetries are small enough,
the solutions must be in [0, 1]× [0, 1] for both systems of equations. ¥
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Proof of Proposition 1 It is easy to verify that, for any α ∈ (0, 1), the two equations
in ρ, xPP (ρ;α) = xI(ρ;α) and xPG(ρ;α) = xI(ρ;α) have a unique solution in, respectively,
(0, ρ∗) and (0, ρ
∗
1−α). We denote them as ρ1(α) and ρ2(α) respectively. Since xI(ρ;α) is
decreasing in ρ while xPP (ρ;α) and xPG(ρ;α) are increasing, xI(ρ;α) crosses the other two
loci from above. It follows that for ρ < ρ1(α), Π (x, 1, 0; ρ, α) < 0 for any x ≤ xPP (ρ;α),
so one cannot have a Good News equilibrium. For ρ ≥ ρ1(α), Π (xPP (ρ;α), 1, 0; ρ, α) ≥
0 > Π (1, 0, 0; ρ, α) so, by continuity, there is always a unique yPP ∈ (0, 1) such that
Π (xPP (ρ;α), yPP , 0; ρ, α) = 0. Clearly xPP (ρ;α) and yPP then deÞne an equilibrium,
since these values respectively make the weak type at the interim stage and the second-
period Self willing to mix. A similar argument shows that a Bad News equilibrium
exists if and only if ρ ≤ ρ2(α). To see that for ρ1(α) ≤ ρ ≤ ρ2(α) we also have
an Extreme News equilibrium, note that in this range xI(ρ;α) ∈ [xPP (ρ;α), xPG(ρ;α)]
and Π (xI(ρ;α), 1, 0; ρ, α) = 0, so the weak type is willing to mix at the interim stage
given the optimal reaction of the second period Self. Finally, since as α ↓ 0 we have
xPP (ρ;α)→ xPG(ρ;α), it is immediate to see that limα→0 |ρ2(α)− ρ1(α)| = 0. ¥
Proof of Proposition 3 A Bad News equilibrium is, ex-ante, is strictly better then
staying alone if and only if:
E (WPG −Wa | ρ) ≡ ρ(W sPG −W sa ) + (1− ρ) (WwPG −Wwa ) > 0. (25)
From the informativeness constraint (23) we have xPG = (1− α) (ρ/ρ∗ − ρ) / (1− ρ+ αρ) ;
in the limiting case where the agent is alone (α = 0) this becomes xa = (ρ/ρ∗ − ρ) / (1− ρ) .
Substituting into conditions (15) and (16), we can then rewrite (25) as:
Ψ(ρ, ρ∗) ≡ (ρ∗ − 1)k(ρ) + ρ∗ − (1− α)ρ < 0, where (26)
k(ρ) ≡ (1− β) cH
βδ (1− yPG(ρ)) (B − cL − a) . (27)
The function Ψ is increasing in ρ∗ and decreasing in ρ. The Þrst claim is obvious, and
the second follows from the fact that yPG(ρ) is itself decreasing in ρ. Indeed, yPG(ρ) is
deÞned as the solution y0 to Π (xPG(ρ), 1, y0; ρ, α) = 0, or
B − b− cH
β
+ δ [(1− α)ρ+ (1− (1− α)ρ) (xPG(ρ) + (1− xPG(ρ))y0)] (b− a) = 0,
and xPG(ρ) is an increasing function into [0, 1]. The monotonicity properties of Ψ imply
that for each ρ∗ there exists a unique ρ(ρ∗) ∈ [0, ρ∗] such that (25) holds if and only
if ρ > ρ(ρ∗); furthermore, ρ(ρ∗) is non-decreasing in ρ∗. To study when this solution is
interior, let us deÞne ρ∗ and ρ∗ by the linear equations Ψ(0, ρ∗) = (ρ∗ − 1)k(0) + ρ∗ ≡ 0
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and Ψ(1, ρ∗) = (ρ∗ − 1)k(1) + ρ∗ − (1 − α) respectively. Then 0 < ρ∗ < ρ∗ < 1, and
for any ρ∗ in
¡
ρ∗, ρ∗
¢
, bρ(ρ∗) lies in (0, ρ∗) and is strictly increasing in ρ∗. For ρ∗ < ρ∗ we
have ρ(ρ∗) = 0, and E (WPG −Wa | ρ) > 0 for all ρ ≥ 0. Conversely, for ρ∗ > ρ∗ we have
ρ(ρ∗) = ρ∗, and E (WPG −Wa | ρ) < 0 for all ρ ≤ ρ∗. ¥
Welfare in an Extreme News equilibrium We analyze here welfare in the third
type of equilibrium, where the second-period self follows a pure strategy. As one might
expect, the results are intermediate between those of the Good News and Bad News cases.
As usual, we have for the weak type WwI = W
w
a + (xI − xa)
³
1−β
β
´
cH . Recall from
Figure 3 or 4 that xI(ρ;α) declines from xPP (ρ;α) to xPG(ρ;α) as ρ spans the interval
[ρ1(α), ρ2(α)] . Therefore we always haveW
w
PG < W
w
I < W
w
PP , and there exists a threshold
ρ (α) in the interval such that the weak type is better off than when alone if and only if
ρ ≤ ρ (α) . As to the strong type, his welfare takes the same form as in the Bad News
case, except that yPG is replaced by 0 :
W sI = W
s
a + δ [PrI(P | s)− PrI (P |w)] (B − a− cL) =W sa + δα(1− xI)(B − a− cL).
Since xI < xPP he is better off compared not only to staying alone, but also compared to
the Good News equilibrium. The comparison with his gains under the Bad News equi-
librium, on the other hand, depends on the parameters. The Extreme News equilibrium
is thus qualitatively similar, in terms of the value of joining a group, to a Good News
equilibrium if xI > xa (both types are better off at the interim stage), and to a Bad News
equilibrium if xI > xa (only the good type is better-off). ¥
Proof of Proposition 5 We proceed in three stages.
A. Proof of condition (18). If both posteriors were below ρi∗ Self 2 would never playW,
therefore a weak agent i would always act myopically: xi = 0. But then µiPP (0, x
j) = 1, a
contradiction. Similarly, if both posteriors are above ρi∗, a weak agent i will always play P,
since this induces Self 2 to choose willpower with probability one. But µiPG(1) = ρ
i < ρi∗,
a contradiction.
B . Proof of condition (20).
1) Assume that πi(xj) > 0. We then cannot have µiPP (x
i
, x
j) > ρi∗, or else agent is
Self 2 will optimally choose yiPP = 1, leading to net proÞts of Π
i (xj, 1, yiPG) ≥ πi (xj) > 0
from choosing P rather than G in the Þrst period. But then xi = 1, so µiPP (1, x
j) > ρi∗,
or equivalently xj < XjPP (1) < 1. Because X
j
PP (x)− (X iPP )−1 (x) has the sign of xiPP − x
for all x (single-crossing property established by Lemma 1 and illustrated on Figure 7),
this implies that xj < (X iPP )
−1
(1), or equivalently µjPP (x
j, 1) > ρj∗. As a result, agent
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Figure 10: Equilibrium set in the general (asymmetric) model.
js second-period self will choose y2PP = 1, ensuring Π
j
¡
1, 1, yjPG
¢
= Πj (1, 1, 0) > 0. This
leads to xj = 1, a contradiction.
2) Assume now that πi(xj) < 0. We then cannot have µiPG(x
i) < ρi∗, or else agent is
Self 2 will optimally choose yiPG = 0, leading to net proÞts of Π
i (xj , yiPP , 0) ≤ πi (xj) < 0
from choosing P rather than G in the Þrst period. But then xi = 0, so µiPG(0) = 1 > ρ
i∗,
a contradiction.
As shown in the text, Proposition 5 follows directly from the conjunction of these
properties of the informativeness and incentive constraints.
C. Remaining Equilibria
When condition (22) hold, the intersection EI of the two xiI loci lies inside the permis-
sible region EBNE0EGNE00 of Figure 7 or 8. In Figure 10 this area is itself decomposed
into areas I, IIa and IIb, which respectively correspond to cases (i), (ii) and (iii) or Propo-
sition 5. When condition (22) does not hold, EI = (x1I , x
2
I) lies in one of the outer areas
of Figure 10. Using (21) and the discussion which follows it in the text, it is easy to
verify in each case that there is a unique equilibrium, located at a vertex or on one of
the upper boundaries of the central, permissible region. SpeciÞcally, the equilibrium is, in
counterclockwise order: E0 when EI falls in IVb; EM = ((X2PP )−1(x2I), x2I) when EI falls
in IVa; EGN when EI falls in III; EM = (x1I , (X
1
PP )
−1(x1I)) when EI falls in Va; E when
EI falls in Vb; and EBN when EI falls in IIc. ¥
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Proofs of the results in Section IV.2
Comparative statics of welfare in the Good News equilibrium. We saw that
an increase in ρ1∗ causes an decrease in x1PP and an increase in x
2
PP . The fact that a
weak agent 2 is always better off from a (marginal) worsening of his partners (potential)
self-control problem then follows immediately from (13).39 For a strong type, note that
y2PP =
y2a
π1LH + (1− π1LH)x1PP
,
so the decrease in x1PP increases y
2
PP . Furthermore, the probability that agent 1 plays P
given that agent 2 is strong is Pr1PP (P | s) = π1LL + (1− π1LL)x1PP , whereas when agent 2
is weak it is Pr1PP (P |w) = π1LH + (1− π1LH)x1PP . We can thus generalize (14) to:
W 1,sPP = W
1,s
a + δy
1
a(B
1 − a1 − cL)
¡
1− x2PP
¢µ π2LL − π2LH
π2LH + (1− π2LH)x2PP
¶
.
From this equation and (17), it is clear that we have an increase in W 2,sPP . ¥
Comparative statics of welfare in the Bad News equilibrium. We saw that,
in this case, a (marginal) increase in ρ1∗ leaves x2PG unaffected. It immediately fol-
lows that there is no effect on the welfare of a weak agent 2. Let us now show that
the same is true for a strong type. Using the indifference conditions of the weak type
in a group and by himself (Π2(x1, 1, y2PG) = 0 = Π
2(1, 1, y2a)), we can write y
2
PG =¡
y2a − Pr1PG (P |w)
¢
/
¡
1− Pr1PG (P |w)
¢
. Substituting this into the expression for the wel-
fare of the strong type, (16), and exploiting the fact that 1−Pr1PG (P |w) = (1−x1PG)(1−
π1LH), we obtain
W 2,sPG = W
2,s
a + δ
¡
1− y2a
¢
(B2 − a2 − c2L−)
µ
π1LL − π1LH
1− π1LH
¶
,
which is independent of any parameter of agent 1, as well as of his behavior x1. ¥
Comparative statics of welfare in the Mixed and Extreme News equilibria.
See the text and footnote 36, respectively.
39Equation (13) was written for the symmetric case, but directly extends to the asymmetric one if we
add agent-speciÞc superscripts i = 1, 2 to all functions and parameters. Similarly, the expressions below
are immediate generalizations of those presented in Section III.
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